Tuesday, November 10, 2009

ALBA Visit #10

Yesterday I read the James Lardner Papers. Lardner’s story especially impresses me because he came from a rather secure and privileged background and still made the choice to fight in Spain (and even support communism). Not that this is unheard of, but it is atypical, especially so late in the war. Larder’s papers suggest that witnessing the war was the pivotal moment for him, but I wonder just how much thinking Lardner had been doing beforehand that led to his seemingly sudden change of heart. I can’t be sure, but somehow I get the impression that Lardner had been digesting the significance of the Republic and of communism for some time, and bearing witness to the war was the last straw, convincing him to volunteer.

Also interesting about Lardner’s situation in comparison to that of the average American volunteer is that Lardner actually saw Spain and saw the war to some extent before volunteering, whereas most American volunteers only saw Spain after enlisting. This opportunity afforded Lardner some unique insight, although it is hard to say what that insight contributed to his thought process beyond the obvious call to action. Perhaps without seeing Spain Lardner would never have resolved to volunteer, although it seems to me that something else could have pushed him over the edge. The question is: what? - Perhaps different media coverage, or different propaganda, or maybe only time. If only more of the world’s Lardners had somehow better understood Spain…

My favorite part of the Lardner Papers is the letter to his mother of 3 May 1938, where he lists his reasons for volunteering. His honesty and clarity are great, and whether he realized it or not, he was articulating the thoughts of nearly every volunteer in one way or another. One could argue that reasons 1, 2, 3, 4, and 9 are a volunteers’ manifesto of sorts. Omitting the word “liberal” and the bit about communism in reason 1, reasons 1, 2, 3, 4, and 9 might have made a damn good piece of anti-fascist anti-neutrality propaganda in the United States, especially considering the author was a relatively mainstream American boy with well established and respected roots.

Monday, November 9, 2009

Research Post #3

I recently began reading copies of the Daily Worker (DW) at Tamiment to gauge how conscious the communists and the affiliated left were of the Spanish Civil War, what they were writing about, what they were advocating, and how pervasive the issue of the Spanish Civil War was in comparison to other issues making the headlines. I plan to read at least the front page of every DW from 17 July 1936 to 1 April 1939, the beginning to the end of the war.

Through this reading I will put together statistics about the prevalence of the war in the DW headlines as opposed to other topics, and I plan to put together statistics in this same way regarding the New York Times [thanks to Professor for the suggestion]. This data, as well as any other relevant data I come across, will hopefully lead to some original insights. I expect DW to cover the war more than NYT, but we may yet be surprised.

I have not yet read enough DWs to make any inferences about my inquiries, but some interesting things emerge from just a few readings. For example, the thoroughness and variety of coverage is impressive, reflecting the wide circulation DW enjoyed during the 1930s, circulating well beyond just communists, given the impacts of the depression and the popular front, illustrated by credo that "Communism is Twentieth Century Americanism". Also, there are a few brief mentions of political unrest and Fascism in Spain in July papers before the 17th, but nowhere near the front page. More to come soon…

Monday, November 2, 2009

ALBA Visit #9 Continued/Research Post #2

In a speech (that I found in the Good Fight box) delivered October 5, 1937, FDR gave one of the first hints that the USA could not remain neutral for much longer given the degenerating state of international affairs, aptly comparing war and disease to explain his thoughts:

When an epidemic of physical disease starts to spread, the community approves and joins in a quarantine of the patients in order to protect the health of the community against the spread of the disease.[1]

The sentiment of this metaphor is a significant reflection of a developing awareness within the Roosevelt administration, and thus an evolving public consciousness, but this awareness developed too slowly and reservedly to change the outcome of the Spanish Civil War. One manifestation of the administration’s reservations is the fact that FDR did not explicitly name any aggressor or conflict in this “Quarantine Speech”; another is that, at a press conference the next day, FDR added, “I can’t tell you what the methods will be. We are looking for some way to peace; and by no means is it necessary that the way be contrary to the exercise of neutrality.”[2] This guarded foray into political self-expression by FDR was better than no foray at all, because it at least raised public awareness, but it registered few, if any, measurably positive effects on the urgent international conflicts at the time, especially the Spanish Civil War. FDR’s speech reinvigorated the national discourse about isolationism without lending any tangible support to the opposition of isolationism.

In hindsight this approach is short-sighted, but at the time, the relative virtues and vices of neutrality were not thoroughly understood, and some part of FDR may still have believed that letting the Spanish Civil War unfold without American involvement might avert a World War. There is also the issue of the State Department’s influential fear that the Republic comprised many communists and socialists, and a Republican victory might empower communism throughout Europe.[3] Adherents to this fear understandably opposed the Republic. Adherents to this fear who also opposed Fascism were presented with a dilemma: on one hand Fascists win, on the other hand Communists win. How FDR may have been influenced by this dilemma is impossible to ascertain, and how prevalent this dilemma was in the public consciousness is a question worth further investigation. The vagueness of the Quarantine Speech lends itself to different public interpretations of FDR. He may have been an interventionist cautiously gauging public opinion, he may have been hopeful that non-intervention could actually be a type of “quarantine” yielding favorable results, or he may have just wanted to reinforce the relevance of the issue without taking any particular stance.

Whatever the public may have thought about FDR’s mindset, the general public reaction to the Quarantine Speech was surprisingly favorable, as evidenced by various statistics,[4] and perhaps if FDR had taken some concrete stance in the aftermath of his speech, he could have turned the tide of public opinion in favor of some sort of intervention. As it stands, FDR did not say anything to reduce the ambiguity of his speech nor did he make any concrete foreign policy proposals, and the public voiced no consensus strong enough to inspire policy changes. So the people who supported FDR’s message and hoped to see it in practice were left hanging, angered by an administration that passed up what may have been a golden opportunity to change the course of history for the better. This anger and all anger inspired by the belief in the illegitimacy and injustice of Fascism, the “legitimate anger” of which Abe Osheroff spoke, compelled many people to take personal action by obstreperously opposing non-intervention and/or volunteering in Spain.


Citations

1. Roosevelt, Franklin Delano. "Quarantine the Agressor." Outer Drive Bridge Dedication. Chicago, IL. 5 Oct 1937. Speech.

2. Roosevelt, Franklin Delano. Nothing To Fear: The Selected Addresses Of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 1932-1945. 'Comp'. Houghton Mifflin Company, 1946. 110. Print.

3. United States Relations with Spain, undated; The Good Fight: the Abraham Lincoln Brigade in the Spanish Civil War: Production Materials; ALBA 216; box 1; folder 30

Tamiment Library/Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives

Elmer Holmes Bobst Library

70 Washington Square South

New York, NY 10012, New York University Libraries.

4. Bennett, Edward Moore. Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Search for Security: American-Soviet Relations, 1933-1939. Rowman & Littlefield, 1985. 98-100. Print.

Wednesday, October 28, 2009

ALBA Visit #9 and “The Good Fight”

Hearing one of the directors of The Good Fight mention that the film’s first cut was about six hours long was no surprise to me after having seen the enormity of material in the box that the directors’ contributed to ALBA. There were probably thousands of pages of interview transcripts, which constituted the bulk of the files, and hundreds of pages of other research.

The interviews comprised an amazing amount of stories about, and insights into, the lives of various volunteers. In a certain sense it is a shame that more of these stories could not be incorporated in the film, but as a filmgoer I do understand and appreciate the editing. I tried to sift through some of these interview transcripts to identify content aligned with my final project ideas, and came away with some useful material. One of my next blog entries will more deeply analyze my findings, but for the time being I will just summarize my research, because there were many documents that I need more time to read, analyze, quote from, and cite, documents that are in the process of being photocopied for me by Tamiment Library (another valuable library service of which any of my classmates without camera or scanner might like to take advantage).

I noticed a couple of questions relevant to my project that were well addressed, albeit anecdotally, by the interviews with veterans: How did those associated with the cause of the Republic become politicized (politically socialized)? Where and how did they get their information? The anecdotal evidence suggests that most of these volunteers and their social networks were approximately working class, were directly affected by the Depression, and thus became politically liberal. It also seems that by-and-large these people became active in political scenes that aligned with their interests, be they socialist, communist, anarchist, civil rights oriented, or just generally liberal, and that these groups became bases of political knowledge, and disseminated and filtered news and new political information. One of the most influential examples was the Communists’ publication of the Daily Worker, which I will soon begin reading en masse, along with pamphlets, etc., to begin answering my questions about particular political perceptions and actions. However, as far as I know there are no published statistics to underwrite these ideas, or to comment on the extent to which people were active in any given group or were targeted by activism (please let me know if you are aware of any), and I doubt I could put together any such statistics given my time constraints. So it seems I will be doing, in large part, what many other historians did, namely, aggregating anecdotal evidence to paint a big picture as reliably as I can. I suppose in a field of inquiry like this, constructing a coherent and compelling narrative out of potentially misleading bits and pieces is a somewhat inevitable occupational hazard.

Friday, October 23, 2009

Research Post #1 Update

Update

The books I mentioned earlier will still be handy to some extent, but the focus of my project has changed, and will be considerably more anchored in the archives. I still plan to research non-intervention and the embargoes, and my project will still be politically oriented, but I will focus on the people who broke away from the isolationism of their time, who were not directly involved in the governmental politics surrounding non-intervention, about and from whom there is lots of archival material, including copies of The Daily Worker, pamphlets on microfilm, letters, and various other selections from ALBA and elsewhere. I plan to juxtapose my findings from these archival materials with knowledge about both the governmental and public politics surrounding non-intervention 1) to explore why and how these “ground-level” participants came to reject isolationism, the popular political stance of their era, 2) to shed some light on the limitations of their information, and 3) to examine how these limitations shaped their efforts to understand and change policy.

A preliminary outline of the questions to be addressed might look like this:

-What did persons/groups a, b, and c know about policies/political interactions x, y, and z?

----How did they perceive x, y, and z?

----What did they do about it?

-What are the whole stories of x, y, and z as we know them today?

----How did x, y, and z affect a, b, and c, and vice versa?

-What can be inferred about the consequences of this "knowledge gap" experienced by a, b, and c?

-If a, b, and c had more knowledge about x, y, and z, how might their history have gone differently? [Whether this last question is appropriate is yet to be determined]

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Professor Fernández and Peter Carroll for their guidance and insights.

To any of my classmates who have not already done so, I recommend consulting Professor Fernández about your final project. He is very helpful and approachable.

Saturday, October 17, 2009

Research Post #1

I began researching my final project today, which is going to focus on the rationale for, the effects of, and the reactions to American non-intervention, probably including some discussion of international non-intervention. It seems that ALBA is only sporadically helpful to this line of inquiry, so I would much appreciate any suggestions for relevant archival material, in ALBA or elsewhere. Considering the limitations of ALBA I consulted the big green Historical Dictionary of the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939 at Tamiment, which was a great introductory source. I suggest using that dictionary to anyone pursuing extra-archival research because every entry is accompanied by a list of suggested further reading. These lists led me to a somewhat obscure book from 1968 called American Diplomacy and the Spanish Civil War by Richard Traina, which I am getting through Amazon, and which should be a useful source. The only problem I noticed with the dictionary is that it is pretty old (I am not sure how old) so there are some newer books out there that it will not be able to suggest. One such newer book is Arms for Spain: The Untold Story of the Spanish Civil War (1999) by Gerald Howson, which focuses on the role of arms, and lack thereof in the case of the Republic, and has some handy sections discussing the American political climate surrounding neutrality and gives some insight into the inner workings of Roosevelt’s state department. I was lucky enough to come across this book searching through the Strand bookstore’s Spanish History section, which I also recommend for extra-archival research. If anyone has any suggestions for further readings or research on my topic, please let me know.


Note: Another interesting title I just noticed on the Strand’s website is The Spanish Civil War, The Soviet Union, And Communism (2004) by Stanley G. Payne, but it’s out of stock at the Strand. Bobst may have it, and Amazon definitely has it, if this is relevant to anyone’s research.